老师和同学们，

本学期第二期（总第122期）分析哲学论坛将于本周四举行，具体信息如下：

题  目：概念形成与概念化：关于模糊性的一种理解（Conception and Conceptualization: A Perspective on Viewing Vagueness）

报告人：郭  鹏 副教授

主持人：苏庆辉 副研究员

时  间：3月16日18:30 ~ 20:30

地  点：威廉希尔中心校区，知新楼A座1421教室

摘  要：

经验概念的形成基于有限的观察，它因此需要向未知对象与其他可能性保持开放。休谟关于归纳的悖论生动地说明了这一点。从这个角度看，所有的自然类概念都是边界模糊的。然而，经验概念一旦形成以后，它的描述性內容还会被当作分类的标准来对实在的事物进行分类——我把这一过程称为“概念化”。如果在概念化的过程中，作为分类的标准被视为是刚性的，即准入的界限是明确的，那么就会出现骑墙例子（borderline cases)。概念化因此变成一种语言暴力：将连续的实在切割成片断。模糊性，是经验概念形成中的伴生现象，这一现象在刚性标准的概念化中被变成一个有待解决的问题。

（The formation of an empirical concept is based on limited observation. This concept has to open to unknown candidates and further possibilities. This situation is famously illustrated by Hume's paradox of induction. From this perspective, all natural kind terms are vague. However, empirical concepts are also used to classify items in the real world. For this purpose, the descriptive content of a particular empirical concept is often used as a criterion in classification, which I call the process of conceptualization. A conceptualization is exclusive when it draws a clear boundary between the qualified cases and the unqualified cases, according to certain criteria. It thereby perpetrates a type of conceptual violation, viz., by cutting a continuum into sections. It sets up a border where there are, in fact, borderline cases. Vagueness is a phenomenon alone with empirical conception. Vagueness only becomes an issue in exclusive conceptualization, in which borderline cases become unsolved problems.）

欢迎各位前来听讲、讨论！

威廉希尔分析哲学研究中心